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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-1635 
_____________ 
 
PETER HILBURN; FELICIA RYAN, 
      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
BAYONNE PARKING AUTHORITY; JOSEPH DORIA, individually and in his official 
capacities; THE CITY OF BAYONNE, A Municipal Corporation; PETER CRESCI, 
individually and in his official capacities; ROCCO COVIELLO, individually and in his 
official capacitites as Chairman of the Bayonne Parking Authority; MICHAEL 
PIERSON; KATHY LORE; BAYONNE PARKING AUTHORITY COMMISSIONERS 
1-10, individually and in their official capacities 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No.:  2-07-cv-05211) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2014 
      
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed:  April 4, 2014) 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Peter Hilburn and Felicia Ryan appeal from the District Court’s order granting 
Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment and imposing sanctions.  Specifically, 
Appellants argue that they presented sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary 
judgment.  Appellants argue further that the District Court did not meet the procedural or 
substantive requirements mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) & (d) in 
imposing sanctions.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the rulings of the 
District Court.   
I. Background1 
  Appellants brought suit against the City of Bayonne, Mayor Joseph Doria, Peter 
Cresci and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating, among other things, 
their First Amendment rights and the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act 
(“CEPA”).  Appellants allege that the City of Bayonne and Mayor Doria terminated them 
from the Bayonne Parking Authority (“BPA”) in retaliation for reporting abuses of power 
and other wrongdoing at the BPA, including illegal dismissal of parking tickets and 
improper invoicing.   
 On January 18, 2011, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  
Appellants requested additional time in order to depose Mayor Doria.  Following Mayor 
Doria’s deposition, Appellants filed their Opposition Brief on July 15, 2011.  Appellants’ 
                                              
1 These facts are taken primarily from the District Court opinion.   
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brief contained a declaration from Peter Cresci.2  Cresci’s Declaration contained details 
about Mayor Doria’s interaction with BPA commissioners and employees, which Cresci 
observed while serving as Assistant Counsel for the City and General Counsel for the 
BPA.   
 Following this filing, Appellees sought to depose Cresci.  Appellants voiced their 
opposition to this deposition, sought to limit the scope and were generally unhelpful in 
scheduling the deposition.  The record also indicates that Cresci refused to be deposed.  
Following a status conference in September 2011, the Honorable Joseph A. Dickson 
(U.S.M.J.), agreed to issue a subpoena for Cresci to attend a deposition.  Cresci moved to 
quash the subpoena, but the Court denied the motion.   
 After several re-scheduled depositions, Cresci was set to be deposed on January 
12, 2012.  On January 11, 2012, Appellants filed a new Opposition Brief which omitted 
the Cresci Declaration included in the July 15, 2011 filing.  Along with this filing, 
Appellants’ Counsel sent a letter to Judge Dickson in which she stated that the reason for 
the withdrawal of the Cresci Declaration was that the “information contained in the 
[declaration] can be independently verified and corroborated through the available 
evidence already on record.”  (P.A. 86.)  Not surprisingly, Cresci did not appear for his 
deposition on January 12. 
 On February 3, 2012, Appellees made a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.  
Appellees argued that Appellants’ Counsel should be subject to Rule 11 sanctions for 
filing the Cresci Declaration, resisting efforts to depose Cresci and then, the day before 
                                              
2 Peter Cresci was dismissed with prejudice as a defendant in this case on April 28, 2011. 
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the scheduled court-ordered deposition, filing an amended brief omitting any reference to 
the Declaration.  Appellees’ Br. at 6.   
 The District Court granted both the Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
Motion for Sanctions.  In imposing sanctions, the District Court noted that Counsel “did 
not make reasonable inquiry into both the facts and law regarding her objections to Mr. 
Cresci’s deposition.”  (P.A. 12.)  The District Court required Appellants’ Counsel to 
reimburse Appellees’ fees only related to the motion practice in connection with Cresci’s 
deposition, and not Cresci’s efforts to quash the subpoena.     
II. Discussion3 
A. Motion for Summary Judgment 
 Although Appellants devote the majority of their brief to the issue of sanctions, we 
will begin our analysis by addressing their argument that the District Court erroneously 
granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.  We exercise plenary review over a 
grant of summary judgment. Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia, 719 F.3d 295, 299 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In making this determination, the court must interpret the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. U.S. ex rel. Kosenske v. 
Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009).  
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(1), (3).  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 Despite Appellants’ vigorous argument to the contrary, we agree with the District 
Court that Appellants “have failed to proffer evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact” as to any of their allegations.  (P.A. 9.)  Appellants simply make several 
assertions upon which they repeatedly rely in an effort to prove their allegations.  The 
record, along with Appellants’ Brief, does not present evidence that Mayor Doria or the 
City of Bayonne were responsible for the termination of either Appellant.  Further, 
Mayor Doria and the City clearly do not meet the definition of “employer” under CEPA4, 
nor was there any evidence establishing a causal connection between Appellants’ whistle 
blowing activity and the adverse employment action.5   
 We see little reason to expand on the well reasoned opinion of the District Court 
with regard to its grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees.  Consequently, we 
will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. 
B. Sanctions 
 We review a district court’s imposition of sanctions for abuse of discretion.  
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400-01 (1990); Jones v. Pittsburgh 
Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990).  We have said that “such an abuse 
                                              
4 “Employer” is defined under CEPA as “any individual . . . or any person or group of 
persons acting directly or indirectly on behalf of or in the interest of an employer with the 
employer’s consent.”  N.J.S.A 34:19-2(a).  
5 To succeed on a claim under CEPA, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) he reasonably 
believed that his employer’s conduct was violating a law or rule or regulation 
promulgated pursuant to law, (2) he objected to the conduct, (3) an adverse employment 
action was taken against him, and (4) a causal connection exists between the 
whistleblowing activity and the adverse employment action.”  Sarnowski v. Air Brooke 
Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 
893, 900 (2003)). 
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occurs when the court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant 
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  In re: Orthopedic Bone 
Screw Products Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 795 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 While we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
sanctions, Rule 11 may not have been the proper vehicle to do so.  If the conduct of 
Appellants’ Counsel, Ms. De Soto, is viewed as occurring in connection with discovery, 
Rule 11 does not apply, by its own terms.  Rule 11(d) states: “This rule does not apply to 
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 
through 37.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d).  Appellees urge that Rule 11(b) applies because the 
conduct occurred in connection with the filing of the new Opposition Brief.  But we view 
the entire course of conduct to have been related to discovery.  We need not resolve this 
apparent conflict, however, because there are other sources of authority for the District 
Court’s imposition of sanctions, namely, 28 U.S.C. § 1927.   
 Rule 37(b) applies when there is a failure to comply with a court order, and, under 
37(b)(2)(C) the attorney advising a party who has failed to comply with an order can be 
sanctioned by the imposition of “reasonable expenses” caused by the failure.  Here, 
technically, Ms. De Soto was not Cresci’s counsel, and the District Court was not 
sanctioning her for Cresci’s failure to comply with the subpoena, but, rather for Ms. De 
Soto’s own conduct: 
If Ms. De Soto knew, as she admits in her letter to Judge Dickson, that “the 
information contained in the [declaration] can be independently verified 
and corroborated through the evidence already on the record,” her 
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continued protests to the deposition of Mr. Cresci unnecessarily delayed the 
litigation of an already long, drawn out case.  She did not make ‘reasonable 
inquiry into both the facts and law’ regarding her objections to Mr. Cresci’s 
deposition.  
 
(P.A. 12.) 
Thus, Rule 37 does not supply the appropriate source of the Court’s power to sanction 
Ms. De Soto.   
 Notably, the District Court cited to footnote 7 of In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. 
Sales Practice Litig. Actions, which specifically refers to 28 U.S.C. § 1927:  “For 
example, § 1927 sanctions are applicable only to an attorney and requires a finding of bad 
faith.  Rule 11 authorizes sanctions against a signer of a pleading, etc. presented for an 
improper purpose and requires only a showing of objectively unreasonable conduct.”  
278 F.3d 175, 187 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).  The text of 28 U.S.C. § 
1927 reads:  
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in 
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to 
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct. 
 
 In Prudential Ins. Co., we addressed not only the statutory basis of § 1927, but 
also the basis for the imposition of sanctions founded on the inherent authority of the 
courts:  “It has long been understood that certain implied powers must necessarily result 
to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution, powers which cannot be 
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.”  
Prudential Ins. Co., 278 F.3d at 188 (quoting Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C., v. 
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Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1224 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Imposition of sanctions 
pursuant to the court’s inherent power are warranted when a party has “acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.”  Id. at 189 (quoting Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991)) 
 We noted in Prudential Ins. Co., however, that relying on inherent power is not 
called for where statutory or rules-based sanctions are “entirely adequate.”  Id.  Here, we 
conclude, as we did in Prudential Ins. Co., that § 1927 is adequate.6  While under § 1927 
there must be an unreasonable, willful delay of proceedings that increase costs, done in 
bad faith or by intentional misconduct, Williams v. Giant Eagle Markets, Inc., 883 F.2d 
1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989), these findings need not be explicit.  Prudential Ins. Co., 278 
F.3d at 189.  In Prudential Ins. Co., we reviewed the course of conduct and concluded 
that the District Court’s findings of “obfuscation” and “mean-spiritedness” were not 
clearly erroneous, and the imposition of sanctions as a result of that “vexatious conduct” 
was not an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 190.      
  Similarly here, we believe the language quoted above demonstrates that the 
District Court found the requisite factors under § 1927 to be satisfied.7  In reviewing the 
actions of Ms. De Soto from July 15, 2011 to January 11, 2012, we find a course of 
                                              
6 We note however, that as bad faith is at the heart of both bases, the distinction is 
somewhat blurred, except it is clear that § 1927 is aimed at the type of situation that 
occurred here, namely, deterrence of intentional and unnecessary delay.  Zuk v. E. Pa. 
Psychiatric Inst., 103 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
7 “§ 1927 requires a court to find an attorney has (1) multiplied proceedings; (2) in an 
unreasonable and vexatious manner; (3) thereby increasing the cost of the proceedings; 
and (4) doing so in bad faith or by intentional misconduct.”  Prudential Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 
at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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conduct that easily supports a finding of bad faith and intentionality that multiplied 
proceedings with attendant delays.  Specifically, on the eve of Cresci’s scheduled 
deposition, Appellants filed a new Opposition Brief that excluded Cresci’s Declaration 
and sent a letter to the Court in which Ms. De Soto admitted that the information in the 
Cresci Declaration could be independently verified in the record.  Appellees correctly 
point out that this new maneuver did nothing to dispel the need for Cresci’s deposition, as 
Ms. De Soto continued to maintain that she would call Cresci as a witness.  Thus, the 
filing of the new Opposition Brief was a meaningless diversion that imposed, in essence, 
another roadblock to discovering the information Cresci would testify to.  Indeed, Ms. De 
Soto’s actions from, and after, July, 2011, particularly the timing and contents of the 
second filing, suggest a deliberate effort to delay proceedings and hamper opposing 
counsel’s ability to represent his clients.   
 In sum, we find no basis in the record to conclude that the District Court abused its 
discretion in imposing sanctions, nor any reason to conclude that its implicit finding of 
bad faith was clearly erroneous.  Although reliance on Rule 11 may have been misplaced, 
we view Ms. De Soto’s actions as providing a basis for the imposition of sanctions within 
the District Court’s discretion.  Thus, we find no abuse of discretion.   
III. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
both in regards to its grant of summary judgment and its imposition of sanctions.    
